Case studies – Due diligence, risk assessments and management

A PhD student at an Australian university is undertaking a research project in the field of chemical engineering. The topic of their research has a sensitive dual-use application relating to chemical toxic agents and is linked to technologies that could have potential to impact Australia’s national interests.

The PhD student is supervised by a senior academic at the Australian university who is project leader, but they also work closely with postdoctoral fellows in their department and researchers at foreign universities. The PhD student has formed a friendly working relationship with a foreign researcher at an overseas university who is working on a different project with no sensitive dual-use application, and is collaborating with other researchers in the PhD student’s department. 

University Response – Consideration Point One:

Awareness Raising – Sensitive Research

• The university should ensure staff and students are appropriately educated about the threat of foreign interference to research, especially in areas which are associated with critical or dual-use technology, military capability, politically sensitive subjects, or where the research is an attractive target for foreign powers, such as where Australia is a world-leader.
  • For more information, the university may wish to direct staff and students to the List of Critical Technologies in the National Interest
  • The university should also ensure that staff and students are aware of their obligations, including possible exemptions or permits, if their research is regulated under the Defence Strategic Goods List.

Threat: Possible risk of foreign interference

Recently the foreign researcher has been regularly inquiring with the PhD student about their findings, asking whether they can read the project materials, and offering to collaborate on some components of the project. When asked by the PhD student why they had such an interest in this separate area of work, the foreign researcher is reluctant to provide further information. However, conscious of the opportunity to work with a more senior colleague and solidify their reputation, the PhD student responds that they may be interested in collaborating with the foreign researcher in the future. 

The foreign researcher continues requesting the PhD student share the findings of their research, and offers significant financial rewards for collaboration including expenses-paid research trips in the future.

University Response – Consideration Point Two:

Awareness Raising – Suspicious Approaches

• The university should ensure staff and students have the ability to recognise a suspicious approach from a foreign power or its proxy. A suspicious approach may include:
  • Unsolicited or persistent approaches to form a research collaboration or partnership, or gain access research and data, especially in areas associated with critical and dual-use technology. 
  • Overly generous terms of any proposed partnership or collaboration, including financial or career incentives.
  • Excessive urgency to agree to a partnership or collaboration quickly, or pressure to circumvent usual processes.
    • For more information the university may wish to direct staff and students to the Protect your research.
• The university should also ensure staff and students are aware of how and where to raise concerns and report suspicious approaches – e.g. to the university security team or equivalent.

Threat: Possible risk of foreign interference

The PHD student begins to feel uncomfortable with the amount of pressure the foreign researcher is putting on them, especially with regard to the financial rewards, and discusses the issue with their project leader who was not previously informed about the collaboration approaches. The project leader is concerned by these approaches and reports the issue to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Research and the University Security team. 

University Response – Consideration Point Three:

University Response

• Due to persistent approaches, reluctance to provide further information, and offers of financial reward, the conduct of the foreign researcher should be deemed suspicious.
• Accordingly, university should conduct a due diligence assessment considering:
  • The information provided to the university by the foreign researcher when entering the separate research collaboration.
  • The potential motivation of the foreign researcher to collaborate with the PhD student, as well as the nature of their approach to the PhD student.
  • The nature of the research subject to the proposed collaboration.
• Although the project that the foreign researcher is working on does not have sensitive, dual-use applications, the nature of their approach to the PhD student as well as the sensitive topic of the PhD student’s research gives the due diligence assessors cause for concern.
• The university should also undertake due diligence through open source research and intelligence from other institutions and researchers, considering:
  • Whether the foreign researcher has any undeclared affiliations with other researchers or institutions, including universities without institutional autonomy, and universities with links to foreign militaries and governments.
  • Previous experience of the foreign researcher in employment and study, particularly where that experience is relevant to the research conducted by the PhD student
  • Whether the foreign researcher has previously collaborated with researchers, institutions, or organisations with a potential interest in the PhD student’s research.
  • Whether the foreign researcher has current or previous involvement with talent recruitment programs.
• The following resources provide further information, and may further assist universities in undertaking due diligence assessments:
  • Due Diligence Checklist 
  • Due Diligence Assistance Framework
  • The ASIO Due Diligence Integrity Tool – please contact the ASIO Outreach Team at outreach@asio.gov.au for a copy.
• If the university’s due diligence assessment raises concerns relating to any of the factors outlined above, the university should:
  • Make a report to the ASIO Notifiable Incidents, Threats and Reportable Observations portal.
  • Consider taking steps to cease the research partnership, and escalating the concerns to a higher authority within the organisation for decision. 

Threat: Identified risk of foreign interference

For more information on appropriate Government contact points and reporting mechanisms for foreign interference concerns, universities can refer to the National Security Architecture Placemat. 

A professor (the professor) at an Australian university (the university) specialising in advanced batteries for clean energy is approached by a foreign university to become an Adjunct Professor at their Centre for Renewable Energy. The foreign university offers to pay the professor to participate in research projects and deliver lectures and cover travel costs for three months of the year.

The university’s secondary employment policy requires approval for all secondary employment with consideration of conflict of interests. In considering the professor’s application for secondary employment the university considered:

• advanced batteries is an area which the university is world leading and highly sought after by international partners
• advanced batteries has potential dual use, however the foreign university’s Centre of Renewable Energy is leading a number of projects to apply advanced battery technology to clean energy
• engagement with Defence Export Controls to understand the export control status of the advanced battery technology and the instances where permits are required for physical exports and electronic supply of the technology beyond Australia
• that the foreign university is domiciled in a country that ranks highly on the transparency and democracy indices (the foreign country)
• that the foreign country is also world leading in advanced batteries research and collaboration with the foreign university would advance the university’s position in advanced battery technology
• that proposed agreement with the foreign university contains comprehensive provisions for data sharing and disclosure
• that the professor’s work with the foreign university would not adversely impact on the professor’s primary work duties with the university
• strong contractual arrangements, including ownership and protection of associated intellectual property
• that the university has a robust conflict of interest policy, under which the professor is required to identify, declare and manage all conflicts of interest.

The university approved the professor to accept the appointment to Adjunct Professor at the foreign university after determining that the benefits of the professor’s overseas work outweighed the relatively low risk that the university’s right to publish, protect or commercialise the research could be compromised. The university was also confident that their policies would manage any potential conflicts of interest or commitments that could arise.

You can use the Due Diligence Assistance Framework and open source information factsheet to assist you in your decision-making.